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iii Abstract  
 
 
This paper proposes an extension to existing models of non-expected utility (NEU) in the stated 
preference (SP) literature. The extension incorporates the impact of multiple sources of 
ambiguity in individual decision making behavior. Empirical testing of the proposed decision 
model was carried out in Australia using a dichotomous choice contingent valuation study of a 
national ‘Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS)’. The results of the study demonstrate that 
subjective expectations of the context scenario and subjective policy expectations are important 
determinants of individual decision making in a SP framework. Furthermore, the results of the 
study demonstrate that decision weight functions are non-linear (quadratic) in subjective scenario 
expectations and subjective policy expectation. Although evidence was found to link willingness 
to pay to scenario ambiguity, policy ambiguity was found to have no statistically significant 
influence on individual decision making.  
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iv 1. Introduction 
 
Stated preference (SP) methods are used to estimate the value of changes in the provision of non-
market goods by analysing individuals’ stated behaviour in hypothetical settings. A two-part 
valuation framework lies at the core of any SP study: a projected future state of the quality (or 
quantity) of a good without policy intervention (status quo) and a proposed policy intervention to 
improve or prevent deterioration in the quality (or quantity) of that good. Traditionally, an 
unmitigated environmental problem is expected to cause utility loss for an affected group of the 
population. A protective policy measure restores the status quo level of environmental quality (or 
some position of it) and thus offers to offset potential utility losses. In a majority of cases, such 
valuation exercises have been carried out assuming certainty regarding the projected scenario of 
change and policy outcome. However, real-world decision making is characterised by varying 
degrees of risk and uncertainty about future scenarios and the effects of environmental policy. 
Especially in situations where outcomes depend on stochastic events, such as rainfall, climatic 
variability or high loss catastrophic events, ex-ante, certain quantification of the scale of the 
future scenario and the probability of the final state arising from a policy intervention may not be 
possible.   
 
Microeconomic theory provides various taxonomies of risk and uncertainty. Knight (1921) 
distinguished between risk and uncertainty depending on the level of knowledge about the 
probabilities of outcomes of an event to occur. Risk is characterised by the presence of a unique, 
additive and fully reliable probability distribution. Uncertainty refers to a situation in which 
probabilities are unknown (Knight, 1921). Recent contributions to the experimental economics, 
behavioural economics and psychology literatures propose further distinctions to Knight’s 
definitions depending on the degree of knowledge about the outcomes and probabilities. 
Dequech (1997) refers to Knight’s definition of ‘risk’ as ‘weak uncertainty’ and denotes ‘strong 
uncertainty’ as a situation characterised by the absence of unique, additive and fully reliable 
probability distributions. Dequech (2000), furthermore, proposes a distinction between two 
different forms of strong uncertainty depending on whether or not the list of possible outcomes 
of an event is known ex-ante. The situation where a list of possible outcomes is known is 
1 referred as ‘ambiguity’ and where list of possible outcomes is not known is referred as 
‘fundamental uncertainty’.  
 
To date, only a handful of SP studies have addressed the issue of ambiguity in field experiments. 
Cameron (2005) applied a Bayesian information updating model in a single bounded contingent 
valuation (CV) framework to estimate individual willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid future 
climate change using a convenience sample of college students. Individual support for climate 
change mitigation policies was found to vary negatively with the level of climate change 
outcome ambiguity
1 (measured by the variance of respondents’ subjectively estimated future 
temperature increase), i.e. the more ambiguous was the increase in average temperatures for the 
respondents, the less they were willing to pay per month to prevent that increase. Viscusi and 
Zeckhauser (2006) conducted a CV study where a payment card method was applied using a gas 
tax as the payment mechanism. Contrary to Cameron’s (2005) results, Viscusi and Zeckhauser 
(2006) showed that greater ambiguity lead to higher support for policy action. Riddel and Shaw 
(2006) used a double-bounded CV study to elicit respondents’ willingness to accept (WTA) 
compensation for bearing ambiguity associated with mortality and morbidity incidents from 
nuclear waste transportation in Southern Nevada. The authors found the coefficient of the 
ambiguity variable to be negative and significant, suggesting that as ambiguity regarding 
transport related mortality and morbidity increased, people were less likely to accept the offered 
compensation. 
 
These existing studies provide useful guidelines for modelling ambiguity in the estimation of 
social welfare using the CV method. However, the utility models used focus solely on the 
ambiguity associated with future scenarios. This paper broadens that focus by using a decision 
model that embraces ambiguity arising from multiple sources, namely, ambiguity over future 
scenarios and the efficacy of policy instruments. Scenario ambiguity is defined as arising when 
the scale of deterioration of an environmental good in future cannot be precisely determined. 
Policy ambiguity refers to a lack of knowledge regarding the probability of a policy being able to 
protect an environmental good from deterioration. Empirical testing of the proposed theoretical 
                                                 
1 Cameron (2005) denoted this concept as ‘uncertainty’ in her paper. We use the term ‘ambiguity’ here in order to be 
consistent with Dequech’s definition. 
2 model was carried out in the context of Australia’s proposed ‘Carbon Pollution Reduction 
Scheme (CPRS)’. About 600 households were asked their willingness to bear extra household 
expenditures to support the CPRS using a single-bounded dichotomous choice (DC) elicitation 
format. Respondents were asked to indicate their best guess, high guess and low guess of future 
temperature change in Australia. They were also asked to indicate their perceptions of 
probabilities that the proposed CPRS will be effective in slowing down climate change.  
 
The empirical model examines the potential impacts of four variables on stated WTP. Two of 
these variables relate to the future scenario: respondent’s best guess about change in future 
temperatures (hereafter called ‘subjective scenario expectation’) and the range of the subjectively 
estimated future temperature increase (hereafter called ‘scenario ambiguity’). The other two 
possible sources of stated WTP variation arise from the proposed policy: the best guess 
probability that the CPRS will help slow down climate change (hereafter called ‘subjective 
policy expectation’) and the range of the subjectively estimated probabilities of policy 
effectiveness (hereafter called ‘policy ambiguity’).   
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the theoretical framework on 
which the proposed decision model is based. The decision model underlying this paper is 
constructed in Section 3. Section 4 discusses the case study and design of the survey. The 
empirical results are presented in Section 5 followed by concluding remarks in Section 6.  
 
2. Decision making under ambiguity  
 
The subjective expected utility (SEU) theory, pioneered by Ramsey (1931) and further 
developed by Savage (1954) dominated models of decision making under uncertainty in 
economics and statistics until 1960. The SEU theory argues that uncertainty may be treated 
similarly to risk, when subjective probability replaces objective probability. Subjective 
assignment is a method of estimating the unknown probabilities associated with the outcomes of 
an event. It involves expressing belief in the language of chance. Ellsberg (1961) was one of the 
first to challenge the SEU theory. He showed that people prefer to bet on an event that has a clear 
probability attached to each possible outcome over an event which does not have a clear 
3 probability distribution; a phenomenon widely known as ‘ambiguity aversion’. The example 
given by Ellsberg illustrates that people prefer to bet on the outcome of an urn that contains 50 
yellow and 50 white balls rather than the outcome of an urn that contains 100 yellow and white 
balls in an unknown proportion.  
 
Several researchers, including Becker and Brownson (1964), Slovic and Tversky (1974), 
MacCrimmon and Larsson (1979) and Curley and Yates (1985), tested Ellsberg's hypothesis and 
found strong support. Since the early 1970s, new theories have been developed in the 
behavioural decision literature to explain individual decision making process under ambiguity. 
An era of Non-Expected Utility (NEU) models commenced in the early 1970 with the 
introduction of the heuristics and biases approach to decision making under uncertainty by 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974). Further advancements in NEU theories were proposed by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) with the widely cited and applied prospect theory, Quiggin’s 
(1982) rank-dependent utility theory and Chew’s (1982) weighted utility theory. Finally, an 
enhanced version of prospect theory, known as cumulative prospect theory (CPT), was 
developed by Tversky and Kahneman (1990) which is now one of the most frequently used NEU 
models.  
 
Khan and Sarin (1988) used the example of a simple lottery to explain the decision making 
process under NEU theory. They describe a lottery L where one wins x dollars if outcome A 
occurs and zero dollars if it does not. π  is the probability (objectively unknown) of outcome A 
to occur where π  is a random variable with a density functio )
2 n σ μ φ
:  
, (
2. Under SEU theory 
the lottery would be evaluated in the following form
 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
1
0 x u x u d L SEU μ π π φ π = ∫ = =  
 
NEU theory departs from the SEU model by assigning a decision weight to the outcome A, 
denoted as  ) , ( σ μ w instead of using only the subjective expectation, μ . Thus, the value 
function for lottery L in NEU framework is given by: 
                                                 
2 μ is the mean and 
2 σ  is the variance of the random variableπ . 
4 ) ( ) , ( ) ( x u w L NEU σ μ =   
 
Khan and Sarin (1988) proposed the following model of  ) , ( σ μ w : 
) ( ) ( } exp{ ) ( ) , (
] [
1
0 x u d w
x π π φ
σ




= − − ∫ + =  
where λ reflects an individual's attitude towards ambiguity in a given context. A first order 
Taylor series approximation of  } exp{
] [
σ
μ π λ −
− results in: 
   - ) , ( λσ μ σ μ = w   
Therefore, the decision weight function, ) , ( σ μ w , can be viewed as an expression of the 
subjective evaluation of probabilities which is a function of μ  and σ . It is not a probability and, 
therefore, does not necessarily conform to the rules of mathematical probability.  
 
Based on this fundamental premise of the second order probability distribution function, Riddel 
and Shaw (2006) offered a NEU model within the SP framework that allows for ambiguity about 
health and safety impacts arising from nuclear-waste transportation. The model defines the 
mortality expectation,  M π -which is objectively unknown- as a random variable with mean 
M π μ and variance . The authors define M π σ
2
M π μ (subjective expectation), an individual’s 
best guess as to what chances of mortality and morbidity they may face should transport 
commence.  , the variance around the subjective expectation, is defined as ambiguity 
which itself is a random variable with mean 
M π σ
2
M π σ μ 2 and variance . The model 
uses
M π σ σ 2 2
M π σ μ 2 , the average variance around the best guess expectation, as a measure for the 
degree of ambiguity, i.e. larger values of 
M π σ μ 2 mean higher levels of ambiguity. Given this 
specification of subjective expectation and ambiguity, Riddel and Shaw (2006) showed that 
individual willingness to face the prospect of outcomes affecting health and safety is a function 
of income, individual-specific characteristics, the subjective best guess of the outcome 
(expectation) and ambiguity associated with that best guess.   
 
5 3. An extended NEU model 
 
The model presented in this paper, extends the NEU model proposed by Riddel and Shaw (2006) 
by including one additional source and form of ambiguity in the decision making framework. We 
assume a situation where E denotes a future event occurring and P is a proposed policy 
intervention aimed at preventing E. For simplicity, it is assumed that E and P are independent of 
each other. We assume event E may yield a range of n possible outcomes (Ei): E ≡ {E1, E2, 
E3…….En}. The Eis can be viewed as points within the scale of E in the form of a continuous 
quantitative variable such as an expected travel time or a rise in temperature.  E π denotes the 
expected outcome of E which is not precisely known.  E π is a random variable with the following 
distribution: 
)   , (     ~
2
E E E π π σ μ ψ π  
 
Policy intervention, P, is a binary variable (success and failure) with an imprecise probability 
P π associated with each possible outcome.  P π  reflects the chances that P will eliminate the 
threat of E, i.e. the probability of success.  P π is not precisely known, hence  P π is assumed to 
follow the distribution: 
)   , (   ~
2
P P P π π σ μ ν π  
E π μ  and 
P π μ represent an individual’s ‘best guess’ or ‘subjective estimation’ about  E π and  P π . 
The variables,  and , represent ambiguities in the model and hence are characterised as 
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σ μ η σ
σ π
2
E π σ μ and  2
P π σ μ  represent higher levels of ambiguity.  
 
V
0 is the base line utility function when the individual is exposed to the likelihood of occurrence 
of E. The individual is given the choice of paying a premium (WTP) to avoid the outcome E 
level. V
1 describes the new utility function after the implementation of P given the payment of 
6 amount ‘WTP’.  ) ( E f π and  ) ( P g π refer to decision weight functions. Y denotes income and X is 
the vector of individual-specific attributes affecting utility. 
 
0 0 0 0 ) ( ε π β α + − + = E f Y X V                    (1) 
1 1 1 1 ) ( ) ( ε π β α + + − + = P g WTP Y X V                       (2) 
 
Following Cameron (2005) and Riddel and Shaw (2006), the functional forms of the decision 
weight functions,  ) ( E f π and  ) ( P g π  are assumed to take the following forms:   
2 ]) [ ( ) ( E E E E E E f π ξ π λ π θ π − + =                                   (3) 
2 ]) [ ( ) ( P P P P P P g π ξ π λ π θ π − + =                                             (4) 
 
E θ and  P θ  are parameters that reflect individuals’ attitudes towards subjective scenario 
expectation and subjective policy expectation respectively whereas  E λ  and  P λ  are the 
parameters reflecting decision makers’ attitude towards scenario and policy ambiguity. ξ  stands 
for expectation.  
The change in utility due to the proposed policy intervention is obtained by subtracting Eq 2 
from Eq 1: 
) (   ) (   ) ( ) ( ) (
0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 ε ε π π β β β α α − + + + − − + − = − P E g f WTP Y X V V        (5) 
Taking expectation (ζ) on both sides, Eq 5 is transformed to take the form: 
ε π ζ π ζ β β α ζ + + + − + = −   ] ) ( [   ] ) ( [ ) (
1 0 1




 = α, β
1- β
0= β  and ε
1-ε
0= ε 
By definition, the individual WTP is an amount that makes ζ (V
1 - V
0) = 0. 
This implies: 
0   ] ) ( [   ] ) ( [
1 = + + + − + ε π ζ π ζ β β α P E g f WTP Y X                      (7) 
Therefore:   
]   ] ) ( [   ] ) ( [ [
1
1 ε π ζ π ζ β α
β
+ + + + = P E g f Y X WTP                                (8) 
The expected values of the decision weight functions are: 
2 ]) [ ( ) ( )] ( [ E E E E E E f π ξ π ζ λ π ζ θ π ζ − + =  
7                                  (9) 
2
E E E E π π σ λ μ θ + =
2 ]) [ ( ) ( )] ( [ P P P P P P g π ξ π ζ λ π ζ θ π ζ − + =  
                                                             (10) 
2
P P P P π π σ λ μ θ + =
Substituting the values of  )] ( [ E f π ζ and  )] ( [ P g π ζ from equations 9 and 10 to equation 8,      
] [
1
2 2 1 ε μ λ μ θ μ λ μ θ β α
β
π π σ π σ π + + + + + + =




P P E E P P E E Mean Y X WTP
π π σ π σ π μ λ μ θ μ λ μ θ β α
β
+ + + + + =      (12) 
 
Given the WTP function obtained in equation 12, individual WTP to support a policy 
intervention is a function of income, individual specific characteristics, 
E π μ , 
P π μ ,  2
E π σ μ and 
2
P π σ μ . Assuming that a higher 
E π μ causes disutility, 
E π μ is expected to have positive relationship 
with WTP, i.e.  E θ >0. On the other hand, a higher value of 
P π μ is expected to reduce WTP, 
reflecting a lack of individual confidence in the effectiveness of the proposed policy intervention, 
i.e.  P θ <0. The signs of  E λ and  P λ  reflect how the decision maker respond to  2
E π σ μ  and 2
P π σ μ . A 
majority of the empirical evidence suggest that individuals are ambiguity averse (Hogarth and 
Kunreuther, 1985; Kunreuther et al., 1995; Camerer and Kunreuther, 1989; Sarin and Weber, 
1993; Cameron, 2005; Riddle and Shaw, 2006). However, Kahn and Sarin (1988) showed that 
individual attitude towards ambiguity could vary depending on the context. They carried out an 
experiment that involved five different decision contexts (radio warranty decisions, 
pharmaceutical decisions involving pregnancy and skin rash and service decisions involving 
restaurant food and film processing). The subjects were found to be ambiguity averse for the 
pregnancy and the film processing contexts and ambiguity seeking for the restaurant, skin rash, 
and radio warranty contexts. Therefore, it could be argued that in a SP context respondents may 
show different attitudes towards ambiguity (aversion, seeking) depending on its source (scenario, 
policy). Therefore, the null and alternative hypotheses to be tested in the paper can be expressed 
as: 
(1) 0 : 0 ≤ E H θ  and  0 : > E A H θ  
(2) 0 : 0 ≥ P H θ   and 0 : < P A H θ  
8 (3) 0 , : 0 = P E H λ λ  and  0 , : ≠ P E A H λ λ  
 
 4. Survey and data 
4.1. Background of the case study 
The case study selected involves an investigation of Australian households’ preferences for the 
mitigation of anthropogenic climate change. As part of fulfillment of its Kyoto protocol 
obligations, the Australian Government proposed a national emissions trading scheme known as 
the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme (CPRS) in 2009. The aims of the CPRS are to reduce 
emissions by 25 per cent of the 2000 level by 2020 and to encourage the development and use of 
emission free technologies (Department of Climate Change, 2009). The implementation of the 
CPRS will affect Australian households as the prices of a wide range of emission-intensive 
goods and services are expected to rise.  The extent of the cost burden on households resulting 
from the CPRS will depend on the final decisions regarding scheme design, including scheme 
coverage and targeted level of emission reduction (Department of Climate Change, 2009).  
 
This study aims to explore Australian households’ willingness to bear extra expenses to support 
the CPRS. More specifically, the study aims to reveal whether households in Australia - in the 
face of different dimensions of ambiguity associated with climate change- are supportive of 
measures that will increase their household expenditure in the form of increased prices of goods 
and services. Two different dimensions of ambiguity are identified. First, there exists ambiguity 
in the context of climate change impact projections. Due to a lack of information, disagreement 
about what is known or knowable, statistical variation, measurement error, subjective judgment 
and disagreement about structural models (Carter, 2007), projections about climate change are 
not certain. For instance, according to the Fourth Assessment Report of Intergovernmental Panel 
of Climate Change (IPCC), the global average surface warming following a doubling of carbon 
dioxide concentrations relative to the pre-industrial era is ‘likely’ to be in between two to 4.5 
degrees centigrade (IPCC 2007). The interpretation of the term ‘likely’ according to the IPCC 
dictionary means that the probability of the temperature rising is between 66 percent and 90 
percent. Second, the extent of the benefits to be enjoyed from climate policy interventions is 
9 poorly understood. Due to inadequate scientific knowledge about the nature of interactions and a 
potential nonlinear response pattern among the biophysical factors, there is a weak linkage 
between policy actions over time and the climate change likely to be avoided (Jacoby, 2004).  
 
4.2. Measuring ambiguity 
 
The theoretical model of the current study involves four key variables - 
E π μ ,  2
E π σ μ , 
P π μ  and  
2
P π σ μ where
E π μ refers to respondents’ mean expectations of the scale of climate change 
(subjective scenario expectation),  2
E π σ μ is to the level of ambiguity surrounding the mean 
expectation (scenario ambiguity), 
P π μ is to subjective policy expectation and   2
P π σ μ denotes 
policy ambiguity. Reliable elicitation of these four key variables is crucial to the analysis. As 
Cameron (2005) suggests, elicitation of subjective expectation is simpler than asking respondents 
to convey information on ambiguity, i.e. variance. Cameron (2005) asked the participating 
college students to indicate a 95 percent confidence interval around their best guess future 
temperature in the form of high and low guesses. This range was treated as four standard 
deviations, squaring 0.25 times this amount to yield a variance approximation. Riddel and Shaw 
(2006) asked respondents from the general public to either indicate a dot point or a range on a 
‘risk ladder’ showing the probability of mortality and morbidity that may be caused by nuclear-
waste transportation. The stated range was used as a measure of ambiguity. The authors assigned 
zero ambiguity for respondents who indicated a point estimate. Although Cameron’s (2005) 
approach to measuring ambiguity appears to be a more accurate, this method is not suitable for 
use in a public survey. Therefore, the Riddel and Shaw (2006) approach of using range as a 
measure of ambiguity was applied.  
 
Following Cameron (2005), the perceived change in average future temperature was chosen as 
an indicator of scenario expectation. Respondents were first shown a figure displaying average 
annual temperature in Australia for the period of 1910 to 2007. They were then presented with a 
series of 32 different levels of possible change in annual average temperature ranging from 
minus five degrees to plus ten degrees centigrade. Respondents were asked to indicate their best 
10 guess of temperature change in 2100 relative to the current year. The ‘best guess’ estimate was 
used as a measure of scenario expectation (
E π μ ). Respondents were subsequently asked to 
indicate a range around their best guesses of average change in temperature in the form of high 
and low guesses. The difference between high and low guess temperature was used as a measure 
of scenario ambiguity ( 2
E π σ μ ).  
 
A numerical probability scale was used to elicit respondents’ perceptions about best guess of 
policy effectiveness and ambiguity surrounding the best guess. Respondents were asked two 
separate questions to explicitly distinguish policy ambiguity arising from lack of scientific 
knowledge and from lack of global co-operation. Global co-operation was defined as a situation 
where, in addition to European Union countries and Australia, at least three major greenhouse 
gas emitting countries i.e. US, China and India, would implement a similar emission reduction 
scheme by underpinning a national legislation. Respondents were first asked to indicate their 
subjective estimate of high guess, low guess and best guess about the likelihood that the 
proposed CPRS would help to slow down climate change, along a continuum between 1 and 100, 
if global co-operation could not be achieved. In a subsequent question, respondents were asked 
to indicate their subjective estimates of high guess, low guess and best guess about the likelihood 
of the CPRS slowing down climate change if global co-operation could be achieved.  
 
4.3. Survey and data collection 
 
Based on the existing policy documents, a scenario description was constructed. This was 
presented to respondents before introducing the WTP question. The description contained a 
simple, non-technical explanation of climate change, scientific projections of temperature rise 
with and without mitigation options and possible policy choices in Australia. The information 
included in the choice scenario and the framing of the questionnaire was finalised after a second 
round of focus group discussion. Before pilot testing, the questionnaire was sent to two climate 
change policy experts
3 in Australia in order to ensure that the information included in the 
questionnaire was consistent with existing scientific knowledge and policy prescriptions.  
                                                 
3 Dr Frank Jotzo and Dr Stephen Howes are gratefully acknowledged for their inputs.  
11 Increased prices of goods and services were used as the payment vehicle. A total of eight 
different bids ranging between AUS$20 and AUS$400 per month per household was randomly 
assigned across the respondents. Respondents were asked if they would be willing to bear extra 
expenses each month on behalf of their household to support the CPRS. A dichotomous choice 
(DC) CV survey was conducted in Sydney from the third week of November 2008 until the first 
week of December 2008. About 3,000 e-mail invitations were sent to a pre-existing sample 
panel. About one third of the e-mail invitations were opened. Half of the e-mail recipients who 
opened the e-mail completed the survey. In total, over 634 completed questionnaires were 
received.  
 
5. The empirical results 
  5.1. Survey results 
Fifty four percent of the 624 respondents who participated in the survey were female. The 
average age of the respondents was about 34 years. One third of respondents had completed 
university education, while another third had a trade certificate. The rest had completed high 
school. Over two thirds of the sample respondents were employed when the survey was 
conducted. Half of the employed respondents were working full time. Median yearly household 
income was within the range of AUS$67,600 to AUS$83,199 with about a quarter of the sample 
households earning more than AUS$104,000 per year.  
 
Respondents’ mean best guess about change in average temperature in 2100 relative to the 
current year was 3.75 degrees centigrade. The median was three degrees centigrade with a 
maximum of 10.5 degrees and minimum of minus 4.5 degrees. The average ambiguity around 
stated best guess temperature change was about three degrees centigrade. The ambiguity about 
temperature change varied within the range of 15.5 degrees and zero degrees centigrade. The 
means of respondents’ best guess probabilities of the CPRS being effective in slowing down 
climate change, with and without a global co-operation, were 45 percent and 25 percent 
respectively. The average ambiguity around this best guess was higher without global co-
operation (25%) than the with global co-operation case (21%).   
12  
The relationships between these expectation and ambiguity variables – climate change scenario 
expectation and ambiguity and subjective policy expectation and ambiguity – are displayed in 
Table 1. First, there is a statistically significant, positive relationship between subjective scenario 
expectation and scenario ambiguity (r=0.48; p<0.01). This means that, on average, respondents 
who had higher expectations of future temperatures also had relatively higher spreads around 
their best guesses. Second, significant, negative relationships were found between subjective 
policy expectation and policy ambiguity both without (r=-0.49; p<0.01) and with (r=-0.33; 
p<0.01) global co-operation. This implies that respondents who were more skeptics about the 
climate policy ineffectiveness, on average, were more confident about their perception. Finally, 
the correlation coefficients between scenario ambiguity and policy ambiguity (both without and 
with global co-operation) are statistically significant at the one percent level. This implies that 
respondents who stated higher ambiguity about future climate change scenario, on average, were 
also more ambiguous about the effectiveness of climate change policy.   
 
Table 1: Pearson correlation coefficients between subjective expectation and ambiguity 
variables.  
    2
E π σ μ   a 
E π μ
P π μ WG
a  2 WG
P π σ μ b
P G π μ  
b  2 G
P π σ μ  
E π μ  
1           
2
E π σ μ  
0.48
***  1         
a 
P π μ WG  
-0.08**  -0.02  1       
a  2 WG
P π σ μ  
0.14***  0.19
**  -0.49***  1     
b
P G π μ  
-0.03  -0.04  0.43***  -0.27***  1   
b  2 G
P π σ μ  
0.11***  0.23***  -0.16***  0.56***  -0.33***  1 
   a Without global cooperation. 
   b With global cooperation. 
  *** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
  ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
13 5.2. Decision model and results 
Descriptive statistics of the key explanatory variables are presented in Table 2. Binary logistic 
regression was applied to estimate the effects of the explanatory variables on the discrete choice 
of paying for the CPRS. In Table 3, results from three multivariate regression models are 
presented. The models vary because of the different functional specifications of expectations and 
ambiguity used in each model. In Model 1, a linear relationship is examined between the 
dependent variable and each of the four key independent variables. Respondent’s perception of 
policy ineffectiveness without a global co-operation was used as an indicator of policy 
expectation and policy ambiguity in the first model. Model 2 depicts the results of including 
respondents’ perception of policy ineffectiveness with global co-operation as a measure of policy 
uncertainty. Model 3 depicts the results of including squared terms in subjective mean 
expectation estimates as well as relative terms of the ambiguity variables. Although all models 
are statistically significant at the one per cent level, the best model fit (see Model fit statistics in 
Table 3) is obtained from the Model 3.  
In all models, the coefficients of the variable BID, the extra monthly expenses households were 
asked to pay for the CPRS, are statistically significant and show the expected sign (the higher the 
bid, the lower the probability that someone was willing to pay, all other things being equal). 
Household income, as expected, shows a significant positive impact on stated willingness to pay 
for the CPRS (the higher the income level, the higher the likelihood that someone was willing to 
pay the offered bid). Relationships between the dependent variable and a variety of other 
demographic, socio-economic and attitudinal sample population characteristics, such as 
respondent age, sex, occupation, education and household size, were tested using backward and 
forward elimination techniques. However, no statistically significant effects could be detected 
for any of these variables.   
 
Respondent’s attitude towards climate change and their knowledge and information about 
climate change mitigation policies have statistically significant influence on WTP. Respondents 
who believed climate change is caused by human action were significantly more likely to pay the 
offered bid amount than other respondents. Also respondents who were familiar with the CPRS 
or who had heard or read about the IPCC report on climate change or  who had purchased a 
carbon offset certificate to offset their carbon footprint were significantly more likely to pay than 
14 those respondents who did not purchase an offset. These results are consistent with Heath and 
Tversky's (1991) competence hypothesis. They showed that a decision maker’s willingness to bet 
on an uncertain event depends not only on the likelihood of the event and the degree of 
ambiguity in the likelihood but on the decision-maker's general level of competence in the 
decision domain.  
Table 2  Descriptive statistics of the independent variables 
Variable Name   Description  Mean   SD 
BID  20, 50, 100, 150, 200, 250, 300, 400  185  122 
E π μ   Subjective scenario expectation: best guess 
of temperature change in 100 years time 
3.72 2.86 
(
E π μ )
2 Square  of 
E π μ   22 30 
2
E π σ μ /
E π μ   Scenario ambiguity (differences between 
subjective high guess and low guess of 
temperature change) over scenario 
expectation 
.90 .88 
P WG π μ   Subjective policy expectation without global 
co-operation: best guess probability of the 
CPRS not being effective in slowing down 





π σ μ   Policy ambiguity without global co-
operation: differences between subjective 
high guess and low guess of policy failure 
22 17 
P G π μ   Subjective policy expectation with global co-
operation: best guess probability of the 
CPRS not being effective in slowing down 
climate change   
55 26 
(
P G π μ )
2  Square  of 




π σ μ   Policy ambiguity with global co-operation: 
differences between subjective high guess 










Policy ambiguity over subjective policy 
expectation (with global co-operation) 
1 1 
INCOME  Household yearly income ($0-7800 to 
$104,000-120,000) 
71.77 31,175 
HUMAN  Climate change caused by human actions 
(Strongly disagree=1, Strongly agree=5) 
3.92 0.96 
IPCC  Respondents have read or heard discussions 
about IPCC report (Yes=1, No=0) 
0.18 0.38 
CPRS  Respondents have heard of CPRS (Yes=1, 
No=0) 
0.55 0.49 
OFFSET  Respondents have purchased carbon offset 
(Yes=1, No=0) 
0.11 0.31 
15 Table 3 Estimated linear-logistic WTP models (‘Yes’ replies to DC WTP question is response 
variable). 



















Indicators of risk and ambiguity 







E π μ )
2  _ _  -.028** 
(.012) 
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_ _  -.276* 
(.143) 






π σ μ   -.003 
(.006) 
_ _ 






P G π μ )






















































OFFSET .634** .608*  .594** 
16 (.284) (.288)  (.292) 
Model fit statistics 
-2 Log-likelihood  701.988  682.116  674.466 
Wald  
















N 634  634  634 
Explanatory notes: 
Standard errors of the parameter estimates between brackets. 
***: p<0.01; **: p<0.05; *: p<0.10. 
In Model 1, none of the expectation and ambiguity variables are statistically significant at the ten 
percent level. The coefficient of the variable G
P π μ (subjective policy expectation with a global 
co-operation) is statistically significant in Model 2. The coefficients of the variables 
E π μ  
(subjective scenario expectation),  2
E π σ μ (scenario ambiguity) and  2
P
G
π σ μ (policy ambiguity with 
global co-operation) are not statistically significant. Model 3 in Table 3 shows the results of 
quadratic specifications of 
E π μ  and 
P G π μ . In order to test for any potential relative ambiguity 


















– were added in Model 3.  
 
Both 
E π μ and 
P G π μ are significant in Model 3 in their quadratic specifications. The signs of the 
coefficients of 
E π μ (positive) and (
E π μ )
2  (negative) demonstrate that the utility function is 
concave in scenario expectation. As the expectation of climate change outcome increases, the 
likelihood of paying for the CPRS increases. However, the likelihood of paying increases at a 
decreasing rate. This implies that, for each additional unit increase in subjective scenario 
expectation, the increase in likelihood of paying decreases. Likewise,
P G π μ exhibits a quadratic 
relationship with respect to the likelihood of accepting the offered bid level. This implies as 
17 P G π μ increases, the likelihood of accepting the offered bid level decreases at an increasing rate. 

















2 exhibits a negative sign which reflects relative ambiguity aversion. This means that, ceteris 
paribus, as relative ambiguity about climate change increases, the likelihood that the respondent 








2 is not statistically 
significant at the ten percent level.  
 
  5.3. WTP estimates 
WTP estimates were calculated based on the statistically significant parameter values estimated 
from the best fitting model (Model 3). Note that the model excludes variables that were not 
statistically significant at 10 percent level, as inclusion of these variables would inflate the 
confidence intervals. Referendum CVM programs written in GAUSS (Cooper, 1999) were used 
to estimate the Krinsky and Robb confidence intervals for the point estimates of mean WTP. The 
procedure calculates the confidence intervals around the mean WTP through a Monte Carlo 
simulation technique by using the estimated regression coefficients   and the estimated 
variance-covariance matrix V ( ).  The estimated WTP values and confidence intervals are 




Table 4 Krinsky and Robb confidence intervals of Mean WTP (obtained from Model 3) for 
the CPRS using 1000 repetitions. 
 
Per household/per month 
(AUS$) 
Mean WTP (at mean of the data)  158 
99 % C.I  138 to 286 
95 % C.I  145 to 242 
90 % C.I  149 to 224 
18 Mean WTP (evaluated at the mean of the data) for the CPRS is $158 per household per month. 
This is about three percent of average monthly household income of the sample population. The 
fitted expected option price estimated by Cameron (2005) was about US$228 per month which 
was close to five percent of average expected future monthly income for the sample. Adjusting 
for changes in exchange rate and inflation rate over the period of 1997 and 2008, the WTP 
estimate obtained from the current study is just over one third of the estimate obtained by 
Cameron (2005). The difference between the values of welfare estimate obtained in these two 
studies can be attributed to a number of factors. First, the earlier study used a convenience 
sample study involving a group of college students whereas the current study used a public 
survey. Second, Cameron (2005) did not incorporate subjective expectation of policy 
ineffectiveness in the decision model. Eliminating the impact of
P G π μ and (
P G π μ )
2  (i.e. 
setting 
P G π μ and 
P G π μ
2 = 0) increase mean WTP from $158 to $319 per household per 
month. Adjusting for changes in exchange rate and inflation rate, the adjusted WTP is about 
ninety percent of Cameron’s estimate.          
 










=0), mean WTP turns out to be $196. This is a twenty four percent overestimation 










P G π μ and 
P G π μ
2 = 0) yields a mean WTP of $359 which is 127 
percent higher than the uncertainty adjusted WTP. 
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
Stated preference studies are carried out in situations where the future scenario and the 
effectiveness of a policy intervention to correct the scenario are not known with certainty. The 
research reported in this paper aimed to investigate the influences of scenario and policy 
expectation and ambiguity on individuals’ decisions to support a policy intervention. The 
decision model was constructed by extending the NEU model proposed by Riddel and Shaw 
(2006). In addition to several other theoretically and intuitively expected explanatory variables, 
19 the influences of outcome expectation and ambiguity associated with climate change and climate 
change policy on individual decision making behaviour were examined using multivariate logit 
regression analysis. Bid level and household income were found to influence respondents’ 
choices to support a policy initiative in the theoretically expected way. Furthermore, the results 
show evidence in support of the competence hypotheses. Respondents’ WTP were positively 
related to their attitude, experience and familiarity with climate change.  
 
Both subjective scenario expectation and subjective policy expectation were found to be 
important determinants of individual decision making in the SP framework. The decision weight 
functions were non-linear in outcome expectations. It was observed that respondents were 
willing to trade off more (less) money with increases in subjective mean expectation of scenario 
(policy) expectation. However, the WTP increased (decreased) at a decreasing (increasing) rate 
as the mean expectation increased. The results regarding the quadratic relationship between 
expected future temperature change and individual support for climate change policy correspond 
to the findings reported in Cameron (2005). In three of the five regression models presented in 
that study, the estimated relationship between WTP and severity of climate change expectation 
was found to be concave (increases at a decreasing rate). The relationship between WTP and 
subjective policy expectation suggests that respondents who were sceptic about climate policy 
being effective in slowing down climate change (with global co-operation) were less likely to 
pay to support the policy. Two different indicators were used to measure policy effectiveness. 
These two indicators reflected subjective estimation of climate policy ineffectiveness without 
and with a global co-operation. The relationship between subjective expectation of policy 
outcome and individual WTP was found to be negative in both cases. In the without co-operation 
case the relationship was not statistically significant. In the later case, the relationship was 
statistically significant and convex. 
 
The hypothesis relating to scenario ambiguity was that individual WTP for climate change policy 
would be negatively influenced by the ambiguity associated with the subjective climate change 
outcome expectation. The empirical results show that it is climate change ambiguity relative to 
the subjective climate change expectation that affects individual decisions to support the climate 
change policy. The negative sign of the coefficient of relative scenario ambiguity reflects 
20 ambiguity aversion behaviour. Cameron (2005) showed that individual WTP for climate change 
policy decreases with increased ambiguity. As climate change is considered to be a ‘bad’, 
increases in expected temperature is expected to cause disutility. As marginal utility is negative, 
higher ambiguity about the extent of climate change causes negative ambiguity premium 
(Cameron, 2005). Similar empirical evidence was documented by Riddle and Shaw (2006). The 
authors found that as ambiguity about health outcome increases, people are less likely to accept 
the offered compensation implying a higher value for individual WTA.  
 
The hypothesis relating to policy ambiguity was that individual WTP for the CPRS would be 
negatively influenced by the ambiguity associated with the subjective policy expectation. 
Although the sign of the coefficient of policy ambiguity variable was negative the coefficient 
was not statistically different than zero at ten percent level. Therefore, the null hypothesis of zero 
correlation between policy ambiguity and the probability of an individual to accept the offered 
bid level cannot be rejected. This implies that, while answering the WTP question, respondents 
focused on their subjective expectation of policy effectiveness and disregarded the associated 
ambiguity.  
 
The questions is why respondents showed relative scenario ambiguity aversion but were tolerant 
towards policy ambiguity. Theory and empirical evidence suggest that attitudes towards 
ambiguity may vary depending on the context and source (Khan and Sarin, 1988; Taylor, 2000). 
Therefore, it was not unexpected to observe different responsiveness to ambiguity arising from 
different sources. Further, respondents were found to be forming their ambiguity perceptions 
differently across scenario and policy expectations. Scenario ambiguity increased with subjective 
scenario expectation. Policy ambiguity was found to be decreasing with increasing subjective 
policy expectation. It is not clear why this was the case. Further empirical investigation is 
required to explore these issues.   
 
Riddle and Shaw (2006) suggested that models involving ambiguity are preferred to simpler 
linear expected-utility model. The utility models they estimated were linear in subjective 
expectation and ambiguity. The better-performing models estimated by Cameron (2005) were 
non-linear in both expectation and ambiguity. The logit models estimated in this study included 
21 both linear and non-linear specifications of subjective scenario (policy) expectation and scenario 
(policy) ambiguity. The non-linear models in subjective scenario (policy) expectation performed 
better than simple linear models. However, relative scenario ambiguity was found to be linearly 
related with WTP.  
 
Finally, the results of the study convey a useful message for researchers seeking to estimate the 
social benefits arising from public policy intervention that involves multi dimensional ambiguity. 
In addition to subjective scenario expectation and ambiguity (as previously shown by Riddel and 
Shaw (2006) and Cameron (2005)), expectations of policy effectiveness can also significantly 
influence society’s WTP. Ignoring this element may potentially lead to the overestimation of the 
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